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Abstract: Successes and failures in monetary policy stem mainly from coherence or lack thereof 
in the monetary order, rather than the tactical skills of policy makers. Crucial here are questions 
of consistency among the economic ideas that the policy regime embodies, the way in which the 
economy actually functions, and the beliefs of private agents and policy makers about these 
matters. These postulates are used to frame accounts of the Bretton Woods System and its 
collapse, the Great Inflation that followed, the subsequent disappointing performance of money-
growth targeting, the breakdown of the Japanese "bubble economy" the onset of theEMS crisis at 
the beginning of the 1990s, and since then, the launch of the Euro and the apparent success of 
inflation targeting. Though monetary policy seems rather successful at present, certain 
weaknesses in currently prevailing monetary orders are noted. 
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Introduction 
Of the 42 countries listed in a recent (June 23rd-29th, 2007) Economist “league table” of inflation 
rates, only two (Venezuela and Egypt) experienced inflation in double digits over the previous 
year, and a further nine (Hungary, Russia, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Argentina, 
Columbia and South Africa) inflation in excess of 5 per cent. To someone who believes that the 
main thing to be asked of monetary policy is a modicum of price-level stability, the assigned title 
of this paper presents a strong temptation to label it as an art that has at last been widely mastered, 
and, given that this is the Bundesbank's fiftieth birthday, to add that perhaps this is because so 
many central banks are now following the good example that this institution has set for so long.  
 This temptation should be resisted, though, because many of the world’s advanced 
economies have been here before, even during the last half century. With the exceptions of France 
as she made her transition from the Fourth Republic to the Fifth, and Japan in the 1960s, the early 
years of our period were a rather quiet time for inflation, quieter than the present in some places, 
not least Canada and Britain, where the success of inflation targeting has recently created much 
local satisfaction, and in the United States too, whose recent economic performance suggests that 
formal targeting might not be quite as essential as its more enthusiastic supporters tend to argue. 
The inflationary facts of fifty years ago, that is to say, when viewed through the prism of 
subsequent experience, suggest that monetary policy’s apparent successes should never be taken 
for granted.1 Evidently they can easily turn into failures, whose consequences are hard to undo.  
 If we look past statistics to the institutional, political and intellectual background, 
moreover, similarities between the present and fifty years ago become harder to find. Coping with 
monetary problems is not merely a matter of what central banks do, but of the workings of the 
monetary order within which they go about their business, and this order - a complicated 
amalgam of institutional arrangements, not to mention beliefs and policy goals - has changed 
beyond recognition since the 1950s.2   
This essay presents a necessarily selective survey of some of monetary policy’s successes 
and failures in advanced economies over the last fifty years.3 It argues that these have mainly 
arisen from coherence, or lack thereof, in that monetary order, both in its international and 
domestic aspects, and only incidentally from variations in the tactical skill of particular central 
banks. It will pay particular attention to the extent to which policy makers’ beliefs about how the 
monetary system works have or have not matched the facts of the case at various times, and the 
influence of this feature of the monetary order on their choices.  Today’s stability will thus be 
presented as the product of a monetary order very different to that in place fifty years ago and 
                                                          
1 Specific data on inflation rates given from time to time below are for year-on-year changes in consumer prices 
taken from various annual issues of IFS  
 
2I first discussed this concept in Laidler (1993). I am aware of having borrowed it from Karl Brunner (1984) but, as 
George Tavlas has pointed out to me, it was extensively discussed earlier by Robert Mundell  (1972)  in an article to 
which Fillipo Cesarano (2006a) has recently given attention. 
3 Thus, the discussion that follows does not deal with the often fascinating and instructive monetary experiences of 
emerging economies in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. There is simply insufficient space in a 
single paper to deal adequately with this material 
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more coherent too, but not to be taken for granted, nevertheless, because some of the very faults 
that led to problems in earlier times are once again discernable.  
The Role of the Monetary Order 
In the real world, the monetary and financial system performs the functions that textbooks assign 
to the “market”, and the ultimate purpose of the monetary order is to facilitate the co-ordination 
of economic activity.4  Given this end, however, its more proximate goals can be many and 
various: price stability, full employment, the convertibility of currencies into one or more 
precious metal at a given price, exchange rate stability, stability of the financial system, not to 
mention the generation of revenue for governments. Sometimes these goals are pursued single-
mindedly, and sometimes in various combinations with one another. As to the institutional 
arrangements and mechanisms through which these goals are chosen and pursued, the day-to-day 
conduct of monetary policy is nowadays invariably the responsibility of a central bank, but there 
is no single model for its interaction with other political and financial institutions. In the 
important matter of setting and pursuing policy goals, and ensuring the accountability of those 
who do so, the extensive literature dealing with central bank independence (of which Stanley 
Fischer (1994) remains a definitive survey) is testimony to the diversity of possible arrangements, 
and there is also good deal of variety, that need not concern us here, in the day-by-day 
implementation of policy.5 
 Beliefs about how the economy functions are, as Daniel Heymann and Axel Leijonhufvud 
(1994) have emphasized, central to the workings of the monetary order. This is because the 
postulate of purposeful maximizing behaviour implies that agents’ actions depend upon their 
expectations about how the economy is likely to evolve in response both to stimuli that are 
independent of those actions - the typical case for members of the public at large - and to those 
imparted by them - a possibility more commonly faced by the policy maker. In either case, 
however, rational behaviour in a monetary economy must be grounded in beliefs about how it 
works, whether these derive from crude rules of thumb at one extreme or from formal economic 
models at the other; and when those beliefs prove to be false, the economy is likely to 
malfunction, undermining those beliefs in the process. Since, moreover, the monetary order’s 
other defining characteristics - goals, institutional design, etc. - are themselves subject to choices 
made by policy makers, and by the public at large acting mainly through political processes, 
changes in economic beliefs are likely to lead to their revision too, whose consequences for the 
economy’s future behaviour will in turn influence beliefs again, in a potentially ongoing recursive 
process, that may or may not be benign.6 
 
                                                          
4To stretch Adam Smith’s metaphor a little, the invisible hand has monetary and financial fingers, and their deftness 
is a necessary condition for the successful co-ordination of the myriad decisions and activities upon which our 
society’s economic well-being depends Though this is not the place to debate the matter, it should be acknowledged 
that this does indeed mean that the “Classical Dichotomy” between the economics of choice and markets on one 
hand, and of money on the other, on which so much modern economics is based, is drawn in the wrong place. 
5Michael Woodford (2003, Part. 1) presents an excellent discussion of current practices, and an assessment too of 
their relative merits. His preferred scheme involves the central bank setting a “corridor” for overnight interest rates, 
and does not include the use of reserve requirements. This is essentially the one currently in place in Canada.   
6This is why the subject’s own history is an integral part of economics, and should be taught as such, a matter which 
I have argued at greater length in Laidler (2004a, Ch. 19).  
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The Bretton Woods System and its Breakdown 
The post-world-war-2 revival of monetary policy and the re-emergence of central banks as 
distinct agencies charged with its implementation, occurred against the background of an 
international monetary order, the Bretton Woods system, whose architects’ over-riding priority 
was to avoid a repetition of the economic chaos that had followed the First World War and done 
so much to precipitate the Second. They sought a stable international monetary environment 
within which national governments would nevertheless have adequate scope to make high 
employment the prime goal of domestic macroeconomic policy, and a central feature of that 
environment was a system of fixed exchange rates among national currencies that were 
nevertheless adjustable should their maintenance threaten employment - though not unilaterally, 
so as to rule out beggar-thy-neighbour manipulation.7   
 The Bretton Woods system did not entirely neglect the price level and its stability, for it 
was supposedly based on the convertibility of the US dollar into gold at a fixed price, while its 
central institution, the International Monetary Fund, was just that, a fund and not the international 
central bank with power to create reserve money that Keynes had initially proposed. 
Nevertheless, for any individual country’s local monetary order, membership of this system 
implied that stability of the exchange rate rather than of prices was the key goal, though its 
pursuit could be subordinated to other domestic ends, particularly the maintenance of full 
employment, as and when local conditions demanded and (in principle at least) other members’ 
governments permitted. If domestic price stability goals were not quite absent from the typical 
domestic monetary order under Bretton Woods, then, they in no sense had pride of place. 
 
Variety within the System 
In all this, the Bretton Woods system reflected certain beliefs about how market economies work 
that had emerged from the inter-war experience. First, they were regarded as unlikely to deliver 
stable and high levels of employment without essentially continuous policy intervention, which 
was why the system left room for the pursuit of such goals by national governments. Second, 
exchange rates were thought to be prone to excessive fluctuations if market determined, and open 
to abuse if their control was left to the discretion of individual countries, which was why the 
system was based on pegged rates. Third, the influence of monetary policy on domestic economic 
variables, the price level included, was believed to be limited relative to that of fiscal policy. 
Since the latter involved taxation and government expenditure, quintessentially matters for close 
legislative control, there was also a presumption that monetary policy should be subordinated to 
the will of elected politicians.8      
 As post-war economies moved back towards greater reliance on market mechanisms in the 
1950s, the place of the central bank within the monetary order would nevertheless generate 
                                                          
7 Cesarano (2006a) presents a recent and comprehensive discussion of the Bretton Woods system considered as an 
international monetary order and of the pitfalls inherent in its failure to set unambiguous priorities for the goals of 
domestic monetary policy of its members. This work also contains an extensive bibliography of earlier literature 
dealing with these topics.    
8The first of these beliefs stemmed directly from the revolution in economic thought that found its focus in Keynes 
(1936) and the second received powerful support from Ragnar Nurkse’s (1944) League of Nations study. Evidence 
for the pervasiveness of the third of them may be found in the Reports of both the Radcliffe Committee in the UK 
(1959) and the Commission on Money and Credit in the US (1961), while the fourth received a powerful statement in 
Scott Gordon (1961)     
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controversy. For example, in the United States, the 1951 Accord between the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve System (henceforth the Fed) re-established the latter’s authority over interest rate 
decisions, making it, perhaps for the first time in its history, an agency independent, if not of, then 
at least within government, as the saying goes (cf. Allan Meltzer 2003, Ch, 8); and subsequent 
uncertainty about how that independence might best be used in due course provoked the creation 
of the privately funded Commission on Money and Credit. In the UK, a sharp local debate about 
monetary policy within Harold Macmillan’s first cabinet led to the creation of the Radcliffe 
Committee, whose Report (Committee on the Workings of the Monetary System, 1959) 
acquiesced in keeping the recently nationalized Bank of England firmly under political control to 
ensure that its powers over interest rates and the state of “liquidity” would be used in support of a 
more broadly based and generally interventionist policy apparatus. And with the coming to office 
of the Kennedy Administration in 1961, closely related doctrines, albeit in less extreme versions, 
began to dominate US policy as well.  
 Nor was debate confined to the US and Britain. Canada and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, for example, also saw lively disagreements about the central bank’s powers at this 
time. Canada’s unilateral adoption of a floating exchange rate in 1951 in the face of the Korean 
War commodity boom - a radical step for one of the original signatories to Bretton Woods 
agreement to take after so short an interval - inevitably shifted the emphasis of  monetary policy 
towards domestic variables, and in due course, a bitter and extremely public conflict broke out 
between politicians and the Bank of Canada, one of whose consequences was a clarification and 
strengthening of the Bank’s position within Canada’s monetary order, though the extent of this 
was masked by the return to a pegged exchange rate in 1961.9  
 The newly created Bundesbank also entered the 1960s with a useful degree of 
independence, though hardly enough to render it unchallengeable.10 The central bank law already 
in place in West Germany prior to the Bundesbank’s formal creation had sought to establish this, 
but Chancellor Adenauer and his allies nevertheless tried to bring monetary measures into a 
politically controlled and activist policy armory during the mid-1950s. A constituency among 
other politicians - the name of Dr. Ludwig Erhardt should be explicitly mentioned here - and 
among the general public too, that explicitly recognized a link between central bank 
independence and the stability of the currency and welcomed both, successfully opposed such a 
development, however. Their success was perhaps not surprising in a country that had endured 
devastating inflations after two world wars, but it nevertheless put the Bundesbank in a distinctive 
position for that time, though not a unique one, for the Swiss National Bank also enjoyed 
considerable independence and was equally committed to a sound currency. In 1961, furthermore 
                                                          
9The “Coyne affair”, as it is usually known, has been described in detail by James Powell (2007). It reached its 
climax in 1961 with the forced resignation of Bank of Canada Governor, James Coyne, and led to a significant 
clarification of the relationship between the bank and elected politicians. Under the so called dual responsibility 
doctrine the Bank conducts policy, but in the event of a disagreement, the Minister of Finance may issue a directive 
that the Bank must obey. However, this must be specific, written, and promptly published. Crucially, and (though not 
legally required) its issue will lead to the Governor’s resignation. The overall effect of these measures is  mutually 
assured destruction should things ever come to such a pass, and they therefore create an overwhelming incentive for 
Minister and Governor to resolve any differences privately.       
10The work of Professor Helge Berger has proved an extremely helpful guide to these matters. See for example, 
Berger and Jacob de Hahn, (1999), where references to other papers by Berger may also be found. My discussion 
here has also benefited from the comments of  Dr. Hans Tietmeyer. 
 6
the increasing importance that Germany would come to attach to domestic monetary stability was 
heralded by that year’s small revaluation of the Deutschmark in the face of inflationary pressures 
emanating from abroad, although this measure was actually opposed by the Bundesbank itself, 
which at the time was inclined to give priority to external stability. 
 In short, a rather wide range of national monetary orders coexisted within the Bretton 
Woods system from its earliest days of full operation (which is usually thought of as beginning 
with the December 1958 establishment of the dollar convertibility of its members’ currencies for 
current account transactions). At one extreme, some central banks - for example the Bank of 
England - explicitly occupied a subordinate position within an activist policy apparatus that was 
firmly under political control, and price stability was simply one among several goals that this 
apparatus was expected to deliver. At the other, the Bundesbank had claimed a significant degree 
of independence from day to day politics, and was already taking seriously its special 
responsibility for the soundness of Germany's currency, even though it had not yet fully faced up 
to the conflicts that might arise between its external and internal elements.    
 
Cost-push Theories of Inflation and their Policy Influence 
Fifty years ago, Milton Friedman’s doctrine that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon” - nowadays a cliche - had few adherents. This was the heyday of academic debates 
about “demand-pull” versus “cost-push” as causes of inflation, as survey papers by Martin 
Bronfenbrenner and Franklin Holzman (1963) and David Laidler and Michael Parkin (1975) 
clearly show, and monetary policy figured in these at most as one possible factor among many 
that might work on the demand-pull side of things. In some versions of “cost-push”, where 
inflationary forces were said to emanate from competition over income shares that was itself the 
consequence of profound social tensions, demand-led economic growth, driven by fiscal policy 
and accommodated by expansionary monetary policy, appeared as a cure for inflation.   
 As Edward Nelson (2004) has stressed, this latter doctrine influenced policy makers in 
some countries.11  In Britain, for example, it provided the rationale for the government-spending 
led “dash for growth” of 1963-64, whose effects foundered on balance of payments problems that 
eventually culminated in the 1967 devaluation of sterling, and for the later 1972 “go for growth” 
budget as well, of which more below. But the US was much more important than the UK for the 
evolution of the international monetary order, and, as Bradford De Long (1997), Thomas Mayer 
(1999) and Nelson (2004, 2007) have documented, these cost push ideas also gained influence 
there in the early 1970s, both within the Fed under Arthur Burns, and more generally within the 
Nixon Administration, and prompted policies that interacted destructively with the consequences 
of prior institutional developments within the Bretton Woods system.12  
                                                          
11 It was sometimes hard to distinguish between the influence of elected politicians and that of appointed policy 
makers. The dominance of the former over the conduct of monetary policy in the UK at this time was taken for 
granted, but even in the US, as Mayer (1999) makes particularly clear, the Fed. was anything but a free agent in 
designing monetary policy at the beginning of the 1970s. This does not mean, however, that central bankers were 
unwilling accomplices in the policies they implemented in either jurisdiction.  
12 Athanasios Orphanides (eg. 2002) has shown that estimates of the “output gap” and “natural unemployment rate” 
available to policy makers in the 1970s systematically and significantly understated the extent of demand pressures 
on the economy.  Though it is possible ex post to interpret the period’s monetary policy as the consequence applying 
an appropriate Taylor-style rule to faulty data, an alternative interpretation of the contemporary policy significance of 
these measurement errors is, as Nelson (2004) has suggested, that they gave a great deal of credibility to claims that 
inflation could not plausibly be attributed to monetary policy, but had to be explained as the consequence of cost-
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Crucially among the latter, though that system had tried to provide for the maintenance of 
price stability through the convertibility of the US dollar into gold, the post war recovery of the 
international economy had created a growing demand for liquidity that was met by a US balance 
of payments deficit; and this, in turn, had generated a chronic tendency for the ratio of U.S. gold 
reserves to its international indebtedness to fall. In due course, therefore, the long-run reliability 
of dollar-gold convertibility had come into question. These tendencies were already evident in 
1961 when the Kennedy Administration took office, but it was unthinkable for the US to react to 
them with domestic monetary restraint. This would have created deflationary pressure at home 
and abroad and interfered with further liberalization of the international economy whose growth - 
given the exigencies of the Cold War, a matter of overwhelming strategic importance - was 
driving the international demand for liquidity in the first place. In any event, in the early 1960s, 
inflation was still low everywhere that mattered (except Japan, where it ran above 5 per cent in 
1961-63), not least in the US itself, where unemployment was judged to be uncomfortably high 
and domestic politics was asking for less, not more, monetary restraint.13 The upshot was a series 
of ineffective ad hoc measures aimed at the US balance of payments - e.g. an interest equalization 
tax, "operation twist" on the term structure of interest rates - a more systematic program of 
domestic expansion - e.g. wide ranging tax cuts, and a distinct easing of monetary policy, 
accompanied by various direct measures intended to hold inflation in check - and a continued 
outflow of US dollars as the international monetary system slowly shifted to a fiat dollar standard 
in which gold would play no significant role.14  
 This shift, benign at first, had profound effects as the 1960s progressed, for it ensured that 
discretionary US monetary policy, and not any automatic mechanism based on gold 
convertibility, would come to provide the international monetary order’s price level anchor, 
while leaving that policy’s executant, the Fed, answerable to purely domestic political 
constituencies for the way in which it pursued purely domestic goals. So long as US monetary 
policy remained restrained, pegged exchange rates would force restraint on other countries, and 
their domestic monetary orders would continue to function. There was, however, no similar 
restraint on US policy. This fundamental asymmetry was firmly established by the early 1970s - 
the very time at which the idea of cost push inflation began, as Nelson (2004) shows, to make it 
hard for the Fed, now in effect the international central bank that had not been created at Bretton 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
push factors. Also, as Tim Congdon has pointed out to me, there was some confusion at this time about just what 
concept of the output gap was relevant for policy. Some already focused on deviation of output from a "natural" 
level, others were more focused on  the deviation – almost invariably a shortfall - of output from some higher 
Keynesian "full employment" level   
 
13It is sometimes argued that the Kennedy administration’s policies involved a deliberate attempt to exploit a stable 
inflation-unemployment trade-off. Though it is certainly true that the Phillips Curve  idea was being much discussed 
among academics at this time – e.g. A. W. (Bill) Phillips (1958) Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow (1960) - and its 
policy relevance explored, a careful reading of the contemporary evidence suggests that the policy trade-off idea was 
not fully developed until a little later, and probably did not begin to influence policy much before the beginning of 
the 1970s, when, even when adapted to incorporate the role of inflation expectations, its main message was to 
strengthen the case against deploying monetary measures to bring inflation under control. See Laidler (2004a) Ch. 16 
14Crucial evidence of this shift is that the behaviour of gold reserves in general, and the declining ratio of those 
reserves to the international liabilities of the US in particular, had no discernable influence on the conduct of US 
monetary policy. See the thorough empirical study of these and related matters by Michael Darby and James Lothian 
(1983). 
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Woods, to recognize that its activities could have any over-riding significance for the behaviour 
of prices even within the US, let alone elsewhere in the world - and it ensured that there was no 
mechanism within the international monetary order to correct the consequences of this faulty 
economic understanding, once the Fed. began to act upon it.15  
 
The Onset of Inflation 
In the second half of the1960s the “perversion of fixed parities from an instrument of discipline 
on deficit countries to one forcing monetary debauchery on surplus countries” noted by Dr Otto 
Emminger in his 1973 Per Jacobson Lecture (p. 40) was thus already well advanced, and the 
international monetary order was awaiting a US policy accident, which duly happened. Perhaps 
monetary stability could have survived John F. Kennedy’s tax cuts and his experiments with 
wage-price guidelines, and even Lyndon Johnson’s declaration of war on poverty, but the war in 
Vietnam was one war too many. Domestic US politics required that its costs had to be hidden 
from the electorate, fiscal deficits spilled over into the US balance of payments, and a world-wide 
inflation was set in motion.                           
 The early history of that inflation, even in a single country, let alone across the whole 
Bretton Woods world, is far too complex to be recounted here, but certain of its salient features 
should be noted. First, though inflation did not reach truly alarming rates anywhere until the early 
1970s, it clearly began to rise in the second half of the1960s, too early to have been caused by oil 
price increases, or any of the other commodity market shocks to which fashionable opinion 
tended to attribute it. Secondly, though inflation was a system-wide phenomenon, peaking 
everywhere in the mid-1970s, it did so at very different rates. For example, in 1974-75, the 
German CPI rose by 7 per cent, its greatest annual increase in our whole period, but the 
equivalent UK index rose by more than 25 per cent. And finally, though its roots surely lay in US 
fiscal excesses and their monetary accommodation, the world-wide inflation’s dissemination was 
not solely or even mainly through a simple channel whereby domestic US fiscal expansion fed 
domestic money growth which first affected prices in the US, and then, through the trade balance, 
prices in other countries. There was some of that, to be sure, but much of the US fiscal deficit 
spilled directly into the balance of payments to be monetized elsewhere in the world economy.  
 The Smithsonian agreement of 1971 was essentially an attempt to re-stabilize an already 
tottering international monetary order on the basis of a de facto depreciated dollar; and it might 
just have succeeded for a while too, had it been accompanied by a reversal of the domestic US 
policies that simultaneously were undermining the system. But it was not: the agreement did 
nothing to address the fundamental asymmetry of a system that permitted them to continue, and 
rising world commodity prices, themselves an international consequence of US policy, were all 
too easily misinterpreted as exogenous “imported” factors amplifying other, domestic, “cost 
push” forces. In late 1971, the Nixon administration introduced wage and price controls to offset 
these alleged causes of inflation, but expansionary fiscal and, with the support of the Fed (cf. 
Mayer 1999, pp 86 et seq.), monetary policies remained in place. The collapse of the Smithsonian 
agreement under the pressure of these contradictory policies, the abandonment of the gold 
convertibility of the dollar, and the adoption by the US of a flexible exchange rate in 1973 as 
                                                          
15In contrast, in the 19th century, the potentially inflationary consequences of central banks being guided by the real-
bills doctrine were kept in check by their convertibility obligations. It is no accident that the great German hyper-
inflation that began under the Imperial regime and came to full fruition under the Weimar Republic got under way 
only when the convertibility obligations of a central bank that had long been guided by this doctrine were suspended.   
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inflation there approached double digits, all followed in due course, marking the final demise of 
an international monetary order that had been increasingly dysfunctional for several years.16 
 The extent to which other economies suffered domestic inflation at this time depended 
upon local reactions to the US balance of payments deficit, and underlying these reactions, upon 
the nature of local economic understanding. Once again contrasts among Germany, the UK and 
Canada, are instructive. The Deutschmark had been revalued in 1969, with the explicit aim of 
staving off imported inflationary pressures - an event that in hindsight perhaps marked the 
beginning of the end for the Bretton Woods system - and when the Bundesbank’s control of 
domestic monetary conditions, and hence prices as well - as it correctly saw it, for cost-push ideas 
never gained much purchase in Germany - continued to be threatened, the Deutschmark was 
finally floated in 1973. Initially this was done in co-operation with other members of the fragile 
and ineffective “snake in the tunnel” program for stabilizing exchange rates within Europe, but 
the Bundesbank then adopted money growth targets in 1974, (as did the Swiss National Bank) 
thus ensuring that the behaviour of domestic prices would have pride of place among its policy 
goals.17   
 In the UK, on the other hand, the authorities seem to have read the first easing of balance 
of payments pressures in the late 1960s as a sign that the 1967 devaluation of sterling was bearing 
fruit, while simultaneously interpreting domestic inflationary pressures, especially in the labour 
market, as symptoms of cost push. In due course, a “dash for growth” was begun in 1972, 
buttressed by wage and price controls that consciously followed the US model. Like the 
Deutschmark, Sterling was floated too, not to stave off imported inflation, however, but to ensure 
that the monetary accommodation of these policies would be free of any external financial 
constraint - which is perhaps why Britain remained in the “snake” for only a brief period. As to 
Canada’s reaction, this occupied an unfortunate half-way house between Germany and the UK: 
after successfully floating the Canadian dollar in 1970 to stave off imported inflation, policy 
makers were then lulled into a false sense of security by its - inevitably temporary - strength 
against its US counterpart, and presided over a domestic boom of their own making that took 
inflation well into double digits by 1975.          
 It is often remarked that the collapse of the Smithsonian agreement and its aftermath 
marked the completion of the long transition from commodity to fiat money that had begun with 
the suspension of the gold standard in 1914. It is less often noticed that the replacement of this 
commodity standard by one based on fixed parities against a fiat US dollar that had seemed to be 
possible in the 1960s was also aborted in the early 1970s, with the immediate effect of demoting 
the exchange rate within national monetary orders. Its value ceased to be the main anchor of 
domestic monetary policy, and a variety of other goals, about which there was no international 
consensus, took its place. Thus, whereas the member economies of the Bretton Woods system had 
                                                          
16 As Robert Leeson (2003) has shown, however, the adoption of a flexible exchange rate by the US in 1973 was due 
to much more than the force of immediate circumstances. It also marked the culmination of the policy influence of 
one aspect of the monetarist critique of post-war macroeconomic orthodoxy, that which originated in Milton 
Friedman’s (1953) essay on “The case for flexible exchange rates”, which had been slowly but steadily making 
converts for many years. 
     
17This episode is described in detail by Jurgen von Hagen (1998). Given the clarity displayed by Emminger (1973) 
about the nature of processes then at work in the international monetary system, what is surprising in retrospect is not 
that the Bundesbank acted relatively early, but that it took as long as it did to do so.   
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belonged to a single, albeit flawed, international monetary order, the flexible exchange rate 
economies of the 1970s constituted no such coherent grouping. 
 
Searching for a New Monetary Order 
Between the early ‘70s and the early 1990s, the efforts of national monetary orders that had lost 
their common international anchor to find a substitute were dominated by sometimes differing 
local goals and beliefs. To this extent the period has much in common with the inter-war years, 
but this comparison should not be pushed too far. In particular, where so-called “Keynesian” 
economics did not really come onto the scene until the very end of the period it seemed to explain 
and provide remedies for, “Monetarism” was already complete as an academic doctrine even 
before Bretton Woods collapsed and the economic ideas underpinning that system were 
discredited.18  In the early 1970s, therefore, monetarists, having largely won a twenty year long 
academic debate, had the dubious privilege of being invited to provide policy advice of their own 
in a number of countries.  
 
Monetarism and Money Growth Targeting 
Monetarism’s basic tenets flatly contradicted the ideas upon which the post-war monetary order 
had been based. It denied the inherent instability of the market economy, interpreting the inter-
war experience as the result of flawed policies; it argued that a regime of flexible exchange rates 
could be relied on to operate smoothly, attributing their inter-war behaviour to policy instability; 
and on the domestic front it argued for the primacy of monetary over fiscal policy, and of price 
level over real income and employment goals. Much of this remains conventional wisdom even 
today, despite the fact that money growth targeting, the specific monetarist remedy for the 
economic ills that had developed by the 1970s, did not turn out well.   
 Money growth targeting was based on two propositions. The first was simply a revival of 
an old orthodoxy that had been pushed into temporary obscurity in the post-war period.19. This 
had it that inflation, being a falling value of money, was explicable as the result of its supply 
expanding faster than demand. The second monetarist proposition was new, however: namely, 
that the demand in question was a stable function of a few arguments. Taken together, these 
implied that, provided some real income (or wealth) measure, and one or more representative 
nominal interest rates, were not fluctuating excessively, the inflation rate, and perhaps the real 
economy too, could be kept stable by having the money supply grow at a constant rate. Such a 
policy had first been recommended by Milton Friedman (1960) as a means of maintaining 
                                                          
18There is no better evidence to support this claim than that, apart from its neglect of open economy issues, Thomas 
Mayer's (1975) survey of Monetarism is comprehensive and remains definitive even today. It is a defensible claim 
that the final major academic contribution to the doctrine’s structure was Friedman (1968), where the concepts of the 
natural unemployment rate and accelerationism were developed. Note that some will find this judgment 
controversial, since it implies another, namely that James Tobin (1981) was in error when he gave New Classical 
Economics the label “Monetarism Mark II”.   
19Though evidently not in the Federal Republic of Germany, for the early development of the Bundesbank’s views 
and position described above occurred too early to have been the product of post-war monetarism, Milton Friedman’s 
assignment as an advisor there in the late 1940s notwithstanding. Presumably, traditional monetary policy ideas that 
were already well developed by the early 1930s in a rich German literature– see Howard Ellis (1934) - had survived 
there among liberal economists, whereas they had been largely eclipsed elsewhere by the so-called Keynesian 
Revolution.  
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stability in an already well-behaved macroeconomic environment. To the extent that restoring 
stability was understood not to be quite the same problem, and that the money growth slowdown 
needed to reduce inflation would imply a transitional, but not necessarily trivial, slowdown in 
income and employment too, the monetarist recommendation was to proceed gradually towards 
the desired long run target.20  
 Money growth targets were not quite the universal failure that they are sometimes said to 
have been. They lasted in Switzerland until 1999, and, much transformed from their origins, still 
inform the “second pillar” of the policy framework that the European Central Bank (henceforth 
ECB) inherited from the Bundesbank, and it is surely not entirely co-incidental that Germany and 
Switzerland's inflationary records in the 1970s and 80s were much better than those of other 
advanced countries. But such targeting certainly turned out to be a great deal more complicated 
than expected, even in these cases, and in many others it was in due course judged to be 
unworkable. A basic problem everywhere was a significant degree of dissonance between the 
ideas underlying the new policy and the actual workings of the economy. Demand for money 
functions, whether the aggregate chosen for targeting was narrow (e.g. in Canada) or broad (e.g. 
in the UK), were found in practice to lack sufficient stability to support it.  
 These problems ought not to have been surprising, but they were.21  To begin with, the 
stability that Friedman (1959) had claimed for the demand for money was for a function fitted to 
cycle average data - whose principal argument was permanent income. Policy, on the other hand, 
required stability on a quarter to quarter, or even month to month basis, and perhaps some reliable 
way of assessing the influence of current higher frequency fluctuations in income on its 
underlying permanent component as well. Furthermore, much hindsight about the effects of past 
institutional change had gone into creating the data on monetary aggregates to which stable 
demand for money functions had been fitted in the 1950s and ‘60s, but that was no help when an 
essential, but initially under-appreciated, policy problem was how to allow for the effects of 
future institutional change on the stability of the relationships that were supposed to guide policy. 
 Even where money growth targeting was introduced early by rather independent central 
banks, and more as a means of staving off inflation than of bringing it under control, and where 
regulatory constraints on the ability of financial institutions to be innovative in the types of 
deposits and services they offered their customers inhibited institutional change - Germany and 
Switzerland fit these criteria - it quickly became a matter of creative and ongoing trial and error 
on the part of pragmatic policy makers, rather than of strict adherence to a pre-set rule. In these 
                                                          
20The formal analysis of the transitional costs of reducing inflation came in the late 1960s. Though Friedman (1968) 
developed its monetarist version, it was Edmund Phelps (1967) who went more deeply into the dynamics of the 
inflation-unemployment trade-offs that were implicit in what came to be called the “expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve.” Note, however, that this trade-off was habitually discussed in terms of Okun gaps (lost output) and Harberger 
triangles (better known as “shoe-leather” costs of inflation) - See James Tobin (1977), and that, because the latter 
seemed to be trivial, the relevant literature yielded little support for serious efforts to eliminate inflation  It is hard to 
realize now that the capacity of inflation fundamentally to disrupt the market economy’s co-ordination mechanisms 
did not begin to figure prominently in the academic discussion before the appearance of Axel Leijonhufvud’s (1977) 
paper on this topic.    
21The change in the sub-title of this author’s Demand for Money, from Theories and Evidence to Theories, Evidence 
and Problems between its second (1977) and third (1985) editions reflects the influence of accumulating evidence on 
his own confidence in the extent of our understanding of this relationship. Michael Bordo and Lars Jonung (1987) 
remains an important study of the influence of institutional change on the secular behaviour of velocity.   
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cases, nevertheless, the double digit inflation that became so prevalent elsewhere was avoided, 
and the policy makers who persevered with money growth targets earned a degree of credibility 
among the public at large for their capacity to manage inflation. New and coherent local monetary 
orders, loosely based on monetarist ideas implemented by relatively independent central banks, 
did become established for a while in Germany and Switzerland. And, as Kazumasa Iwata (2006) 
has reminded us, such an order was also informally established in Japan at the end of the 1970s, 
this despite the fact that the Bank of Japan at that time had only limited independence.  
 In other places however, where, like Japan, double digit inflation had taken hold before 
money growth targets were introduced, and perhaps crucially, where the regulatory framework 
was already configured to permit and even encourage innovation within the financial system - 
Canada and the UK fit these criteria - matters were much more problematic.22 In these cases, 
institutional responses to the tightening of policy itself, and their concomitant effects on the 
meaning of the monetary aggregates, were dramatic enough to cause policy makers to lose 
confidence in the whole enterprise. The 1982 comment of Governor Gerald Bouey of the Bank of 
Canada - “we did not abandon the monetary aggregates - they abandoned us”- found resonance 
far beyond the Canadian border, and has become a much quoted epitaph on the whole episode as 
it worked out in such countries.     
 The de facto abandonment of money-growth targeting in Canada, where its 1975 adoption 
had represented an early example of the central bank exercising the increased autonomy it had 
obtained a decade earlier, had in fact begun well before 1982, but it was still formally in place 
when Canada was side-swiped by the US disinflation engineered by a Fed which, under Paul 
Volker, seems to have very quickly lost patience with a gradualist approach to reducing inflation, 
if indeed it had ever really had any.23 The Bank of Canada resisted the massive downward 
pressure imposed on the exchange rate by US policy, pushing short term interest rates to the 
vicinity of 20 per cent, and permitting an actual contraction of the narrow money supply that it 
was still formally committed to targeting. Canada, like the US, duly went into recession - the 
deepest since the 1930s - and, again as in the US, inflation quickly fell. For the balance of the 
decade Canadian inflation continued to run in the 4-5 per cent range - a little higher than in the 
US, that is to say - but monetary policy remained unanchored and improvised.  
 
The Persistence of Exchange Rate Goals 
The Bank of Canada’s decision to defend the exchange rate in 1981 was but one instance of a 
world-wide tendency for monetary policy makers to cling to exchange rate goals long after the 
demise of the Bretton Woods system, and they had some reasons for doing so, because during the 
                                                          
22Canada had significantly deregulated its financial system in response to the Report of the Porter Commission 
(Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, 1964) set up in the wake of the Coyne affair, as Charles Freedman 
explains in his (1983) discussion of the breakdown of money-growth targets in Canada. Tim Congdon (2005, Ch.3) 
explains the role of the so-called “Competition and Credit Control” reforms of 1972 in preparing the ground for 
subsequent developments in the UK financial system.    
23As Michael Bordo, Christopher Erceg, Andrew Levin and Ryan Michaels (2007) have shown, the likely 
effectiveness of gradualist disinflationary policies hinges critically upon the credibility of the central bank 
implementing them, and since this was very much in question in the early 1980s, a more vigorous contraction 
probably had a better chance of signaling that the stance of policy had changed and of reducing inflation. For a 
contemporary, albeit brief, statement of this insight in the context of Canada’s gradualist experiment, see Ronald 
Wirick (1981).   
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1970s and into the ‘80 flexible exchange rates were orders of magnitude more volatile than their 
monetarist advocates had predicted before the event. And though, contrary to the expectations of 
some, trade continued to grow despite exchange rate fluctuations, not all of the policy problems 
they created were merely symbolic.24  
 Nowhere was this truer than within Europe. It was not just that exchange rate stability was 
thought to be important for the development of private sector trade within the EEC, but also that it 
was required to ensure the continued feasibility of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which 
in the 1970s accounted for around 90 per cent of the budget, and also - far more important - 
underpinned the Franco-German political bargain that lay at the very foundation of the European 
project. The ineffective “snake in the tunnel” arrangement of 1973 was the first of a series of 
arrangements and plans, culminating in the creation of the Euro, meant to address these issues. It 
was succeeded by the European Monetary System, based on a new unit of account, the European 
Currency Unit (ECU) - a weighted basket of member currencies - , and an exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM) within which each of those same members would then peg their exchange 
rates against the ECU, thus implying a grid of bilateral exchange rates as well, that were then to 
be maintained within a plus or minus 2.25 percent band (6 per cent for the Italian Lira).  
 The by then highly credible Deutschmark had a weight of just under one third in the ECU 
basket, and it hence was close to being the key currency of the system, with other currencies 
being forced to adjust along with it when its external exchange rate, notably against the dollar, 
moved. The UK, though a member of the EEC, stayed outside of the system initially, preferring to 
anchor its policy to money growth targets, but these were slowly abandoned in the first half of the 
1980s, and a policy of shadowing the Deutschmark was adopted in 1987 as a prelude to full EMS 
membership in 1990. Sweden and Finland, on the other hand, though not EEC members, were 
informally part of the EMS from the outset to the extent that they maintained pegged exchange 
rates against the Deutschmark, though they did not take on the intervention responsibilities 
associated with full membership.     
 It was not only within Europe that exchange rates issues loomed large in the 1980s. 
Though the Bretton Woods system was gone, the dollar was still the international economy’s 
principal currency, and large swings in its exchange rate against other important currencies, 
particularly the Yen and Deutschmark, were bound to call into play policy instincts left over from 
earlier pegged exchange rate days. So, while Europe was trying to develop its internal monetary 
system, while Japan continued to enjoy the low inflation that the Bank of Japan’s adoption of 
informal money growth targeting had helped to bring it, and while the US adapted to the uneasy 
domestic monetary stability that followed the recession of the early 1980s, their authorities 
simultaneously made efforts to influence exchange rates among their currencies, first by 
organizing a devaluation of the US dollar with the Plaza Agreement of 1985, and then by 
reaching an accord on the stabilization of their parities at the Louvre in 1987.  
 
                                                          
24There seems to be no consensus about why exchange rates moved so much in the 1970s and 1980s. My own 
favorite conjecture is that being asset prices, these variables are affected today about any news which arrives about 
what might occur at any time in the future. In a world where domestic monetary policies were without clear goals, 
there was huge scope for opinions to change often and sometimes significantly about what the future held in store in 
different countries. A corollary of this conjecture would be that the widespread adoption of inflation targets would 
tend to anchor expectations in foreign exchange markets, and hence help stabilize them.    
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The Crises of the Early 1990s and Afterwards 
The difficulty, both within Europe and world-wide, was that the international obligations that key 
players had undertaken on joining various exchange rate arrangements were either incompatible 
with domestic goals - the prime example of this being the expansionary consequences for 
Japanese domestic monetary policy of that country’s Louvre commitment to support the 
dollar/yen exchange rate - or were likely to prove extremely hard to stick to in the face of any 
destabilizing shocks - the prime example here being the vulnerability of  EMS exchange rates to 
anything that might affect monetary conditions within Germany. And these problems were made 
all the more acute by the rapid development of international capital mobility that the 1970s and 
'80s had seen. The international monetary order of the late 1980s was, that is to say, incoherent in 
some respects, and fragile in others, as would soon become apparent. As at the end of the 1960s, 
so once again, accidents began to happen. Two were of particular importance, the development 
and collapse of the Japanese “bubble economy”, and the 1992 crisis within the EMS.25 
 
The Japanese Bubble  
The Louvre accord of 1987 committed its participants to support the US dollar, and for Japan, this 
entailed a relaxation of monetary policy. Had this relaxation quickly resulted in a noticeable step-
up in domestic price inflation, perhaps it would have been equally quickly reversed, but instead 
there developed a boom in domestic asset markets, with year on year consumer price inflation 
increasing rather modestly, from 0.1 per cent in 1987, to 2.3 per cent in 1990 when the collapse of 
the stock market signaled the end of the asset market boom, and finally peaking at 3.3 per cent in 
1992. For Japanese policy makers used to treating the inflation rate as the all-important domestic 
indicator of success or failure, their new exchange rate obligations must have seemed more or less 
consistent with their domestic goals in the late 1980s, and though they must have been puzzled by 
the behaviour of asset prices, it was, as always, difficult to judge ex ante the extent to which 
changing “market fundamentals” unrelated to monetary policy could, in any event, justify them.  
 Asset market booms are usually accompanied by a generalized and significant step up in 
the inflation rate, and a policy that successfully stabilizes the latter reduces the risk of them 
getting out of hand, but asset market booms unaccompanied by inflation do sometimes happen 
and are even today not well understood.26 Nevertheless, the phenomenon was not unprecedented 
in the Japan of the late 1980s, for a mixture of easy money, low inflation and booming asset 
markets had also characterized the US in the late 1920s, (as it would again in the late 1990s), and 
some would argue that the Bank of Japan should have pre-empted the “bubble economy” rather 
than let it run its course. The trouble with this argument is that, by the time it was reasonably 
clear that there was indeed a bubble to be dealt with, it was much too late for so blunt an 
                                                          
25This list is far from complete. There were banking crises in the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, and later the 
so-called “tequila crisis” of 1994-5, as well as crises that affected the pegged exchange rate economies of Asia in 
1997-98. Space does not permit further discussion of these episodes. 
26We have learned much about financial instability, thanks largely to the persistence of researchers at the BIS  - for 
example Claudio Borio and Phillip Lowe (2002) and more recently at the ECB as well - for example Ramon Adalid 
and Karsten Detken (2007), but not to the point at which there can be much certainty about how to deal with it. 
Perhaps it requires the attention of financial market regulators rather than central banks (or, where central banks are 
also regulators, of their regulatory rather than their monetary policy divisions), or perhaps it is a phenomenon that 
signals that market economies are, after all, not quite as inherently stable as we nowadays think, or at least hope. That 
was certainly the predominant view in the inter-war years - See Laidler (2002)  
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instrument as monetary policy to cope with it smoothly: after all, the mid-1929 down-turn that 
ushered in the Great Depression in the US is plausibly attributed to a tightening of monetary 
policy aimed at cooling off the stock market, a goal that was certainly accomplished, though to 
what further purpose is not clear. Thus, though  Japan can be faulted for undertaking international 
obligations at the Louvre that were potentially inconsistent with its domestic goals, it is much 
harder to blame its central bank for failing before the event to recognize and react to subsequent 
asset market developments that only in hindsight can be seen to have been significantly 
problematic.  
 If the body of economic knowledge available as a foundation for any monetary order 
failed in 1990 (as it still does) to provide a completely reliable guide about how to recognize and 
deal with a potentially damaging asset market bubble as it develops, however, “it does not 
follow” as Donald Kohn (2006, p. 5) has recently noted, “that conventional monetary policy 
cannot adequately deal with the threat of deflation by expeditiously mopping up after the bubble 
collapses”. It is an idea almost as old as the institution itself that the central bank is the lender of 
last resort, and that, in times of the crisis, it should inject liquidity into the financial system in 
whatever amounts are needed, first to keep it functioning and then to support its recovery. For 
close to a decade after the Japanese bubble economy collapsed, the Bank of Japan did not do this, 
having concluded that once it had reduced short term interest rates essentially to zero, it had 
exhausted the powers of monetary policy. It was supported in this belief, moreover, by a number 
of economists who proclaimed (and still do) the return of the liquidity trap.27 
 This diagnosis was based on what Orphanides (2004) suggests were faulty readings of 
empirical evidence that were very similar to some of the errors made by the Fed in the 1930s. 
Business and banking confidence in Japan was deeply depressed throughout the 1990s, and this 
surely created (among other consequences) a low elasticity of demand for credit with respect to 
the short interest rate, but the liquidity trap is a state of affairs characterized by a (close to) 
infinite elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the long interest rate The former state 
of affairs used to be called a credit deadlock, (the term is Ralph Hawtrey’s, eg. 1932) for which 
the recommended remedy was, and remains, open market operations on whatever scale was 
necessary to induce a revival of private sector spending, a policy, as Orphanides points out, also 
recommended (though for reasons slightly different to Hawtrey’s that need not concern us here) 
by Keynes (1930).28  In the absence of such measures in Japan during the 1990s, no evidence 
could be generated about whether or not there existed a liquidity trap to prevent them working. 
Quantitative easing, was finally instituted in 2001, and Japan’s economic recovery began, albeit 
haltingly, about a year later. Perhaps this is a case of post hoc ergo proper hoc, but the timing is 
                                                          
27See, for example Paul Krugman (1998, 2007) and Lars Svensson (2003), and see Laidler (2004b) for a discussion 
of the confusion between the credit deadlock and the liquidity trap in the context of the Japanese experience.  The 
fact that I here concentrate on monetary policy measures alone, and do not discuss, for example, the deep structural 
problems within the banking sector that the collapse of the Japanese bubble revealed and which surely required 
policy attention, does not mean that I regard these latter problems as unimportant. 
28Two further similarities between Japan in the 1990s and the US during the Great Depression might be mentioned: 
namely, that between claims made in both cases about the limited powers of central banks once short interest rates 
have been moved close to zero, and that between the abovementioned counter-arguments, and those first advanced 
about the US by such commentators as Hawtrey (1932), Lauchlin Currie (1934), and later by Friedman and Anna J. 
Schwartz (1963) as part of their successful monetarist attack on the conventional economic wisdom upon which the 
post-world-war 2 monetary order had been built. 
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surely intriguing, as it so often has been when the behaviour of money, output and prices has been 
subjected to empirical scrutiny.  
 There is not space here to argue the case in detail, and there is surely room for 
disagreement about Japanese experience, but let me here express my agreement with Orphanides 
(2004) that there never was a liquidity trap in Japan in the 1990s, and suggest that the credit 
deadlock that undoubtedly developed there would have been much easier to break had the kind of 
vigorous open market operations associated with quantitative easing been instituted a much 
earlier. If this is correct, then Japan’s lost decade was the product of a monetary order based on 
too narrow a view of monetary policy’s powers in general, and of its transmission mechanism in 
particular.29 It is notable that the Fed’s reaction to the Long Term Capital Management Crisis of 
1998 bears a remarkable resemblance to the Bank of England’s lender of last resort operations in 
the wake of the Baring crisis of 1890, and that its subsequent prompt response to the collapse of 
the dot-com bubble was also firmly in the Classical central banking tradition of supporting the 
financial system in time of potential trouble with as much liquidity as it seemed to demand; 
though with benefit of hindsight, the response in this case was perhaps too vigorous and 
prolonged, helping to push the inflation rate to well over 4 per cent by 2006, and contributing to a 
housing market bubble whose eventual collapse precipitated a financial crisis with international 
repercussions in the late summer of 2007.       
    
The ERM Crisis and the Emergence of the Euro 
Japan’s problems in the 1990s began with an event that was endogenous to her monetary order, 
albeit one difficult to understand given the state of economic knowledge. Europe’s monetary 
problems at this time, on the other hand, had a political origin, and though they posed difficult 
political choices, their economics was rather straightforward. The re-unification of Germany in 
1990 was as unexpected as it was sudden, and the subsequent merging of the East German Mark 
with the Deutschmark at par (for most purposes) was more a matter of political symbolism, and of 
labour market and social policy, than of monetary policy. There was, therefore, nothing 
inappropriate about this decision being taken by politicians, even though they do appear to have 
ignored warnings from the Bundesbank about its economic wisdom.  
 Be that as it may, the new European political environment required wide ranging choices 
to be made about the future of the local monetary order, and, though the 1992 Maastricht Treaty 
was part of a process that had begun long before 1990, one aim of its commitment to full 
European Monetary Union was nevertheless to bind a now enlarged Germany into the European 
project far more securely than its earlier commitment to the CAP and other programs could ever 
have done. But German re-unification and the need to finance it, as well as the decision not to do 
so out of current taxation - again appropriately one for politicians, whether wise or not - also had 
immediate monetary consequences. The Bundesbank’s key choice was between accommodating 
fiscal policy, and letting deficits feed money creation, or sticking to its mandate to maintain the 
Deutschmark’s soundness. Its selection of the latter option was hardly surprising in the light of 
earlier history, but it presented problems for monetary authorities elsewhere in the EMS, not least 
because it meant that the Bundesbank would no longer meet the obligations to unlimited 
intervention in favour of weaker currencies at going parities that Germany’s political commitment 
                                                          
29Hiroshi Ugai (2007) surveys studies of quantitative easing and finds its effects to have been extremely modest. 
Precisely: the increase in the base and narrow money that it engendered was huge, though that in broad money was 
extremely modest, and Japan's subsequent recovery was, as already remarked, halting, but it did occur.   
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to the ERM had imposed upon it. Germany’s real exchange rate had to appreciate to maintain 
equilibrium within the system, and with a rise in domestic prices ruled out, this implied either a 
major re-alignment of ERM parities, involving devaluations against the Deutschmark, or deflation 
(or at least disinflation relative to Germany) everywhere else - unless, of course, political pressure 
could be exerted on the Bundesbank to reconsider its own inflationary option. The scene was thus 
set for the EMS crisis of the autumn of 1992.   
 A blow-by-blow account of this crisis is not needed here.30 Suffice it to say that the 
Bundesbank proved unreceptive to political pressure to inflate, that, in due course, Sweden 
followed the lead of Finland in abandoning its pegged exchange rate in early September 1992, 
and that, with their currencies under heavy speculative attack, Italy and the UK left the system 
later in the same month, the latter, as it turned out, never to rejoin it. These developments in 
themselves raised Germany’s real exchange rate and hence weakened pressure on exchange rates 
that had survived the immediate crisis, but uncertainty about the ERM’s future was only finally 
relieved later in 1993 by widening the bands within which the exchange rates of its remaining 
members were to be pegged, from 2,5 to 15 percent. With the remaining one-way bets that the 
workings of the ERM offered to speculators thus essentially eliminated, exchange rates thereafter 
settled down close to their central parities.  
 Crucially, the Franc remained within the system, though not without with considerable 
bilateral support from the Bundesbank. It is plausible that the exchange rate's level weighed on 
French economic activity even after the crisis had long passed, but it would surely be wrong to 
categorize its maintenance as a policy mistake. Whatever the economic costs of a strong Franc, 
the preservation of the EMS in some significant form was a necessary condition for moving 
forward with the Maastricht agenda for monetary union, and this agenda had, as noted above, 
only a little to do with economic issues. In due course, the European Monetary Institute began its 
work in 1994, the European Central Bank (ECB) replaced it in 1999 and the Euro was introduced, 
first as a virtual currency in 1999, and then as a fully fledged one in January 2002. A new 
monetary order was thus installed in Europe based on a fiat currency managed by the central 
banking system of a still incomplete multi-national political entity, rather than of an individual 
nation state. And as a corollary, the Deutschmark, perhaps the most successful currency of the 
post-war era, was eliminated in what, at first sight, resembles the kind of currency reform that 
usually follows monetary failure; but the resemblance here is far from complete, for in this 
currency reform, the new monetary order mimicked, and indeed tried to improve upon, many 
features of the old, in a self-conscious attempt to borrow credibility from it.  
 In particular, where the Bundesbank’s mandate and autonomy had rested on an act of the 
legislature, and were continuously under a degree of political pressure, those of the ECB were 
guaranteed by an international treaty which sought to insulate it entirely from national political 
processes. Thus, though the ECB’s political legitimacy, and that of its price stability mandate in 
particular, were (and are) beyond question (as Otmar Issing has often stressed - see eg, 2004) its 
ongoing accountability for the ways in which it defines and pursues that mandate is less obviously 
well established. The European Council’s scope for intervention in monetary decisions appears to 
be limited to the international sphere, and the ECB otherwise reports on its activities only to the 
European Parliament, a body whose limited powers surely contribute to the lack of interest in its 
activities displayed by most of its constituents. National governments, however, remain 
                                                          
30Such an account, accompanied by much penetrating analysis of the mechanics of the ERM, and of financial crises 
more generally,  is to be found in Willem Buiter, Giancarlo Corsetti and Paolo Pesenti (1998) 
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responsible for fiscal policy, but they have been relieved by these arrangements of any obligation 
to consider the monetary consequences of their decisions, and, given the weakness of the Growth 
and Stability Pact that was supposed constrain them, it is not clear how the politics of this all 
important interface will be managed if and when it comes under stress. The possibility that a 
central bank can have too much legal independence for its own good when it comes to setting 
policy goals can never quite be discounted, and Charles Goodhart’s (2006) observation that “It is 
one of the misfortunes of the ECB that it did not allow the political authorities . . . to help 
determine the precise choice of inflation target” might just turn out to have been prescient.       
 
Inflation Targeting 
The European monetary order over which the ECB currently presides is nevertheless the most 
carefully designed such entity since the Bretton Woods system, and the launch of the Euro was a 
technical triumph which surprised many skeptics who had doubted the power of a change in legal 
restrictions to amend so drastically a set of social institutions as pervasive as a monetary 
system.31  In stark contrast, the other major monetary innovation of the 1990s, the setting of 
specific quantitative goals for the inflation rate (either by the central bank, or the elected 
government, or by agreement between them) and their systematic pursuit (usually by the central 
bank exercising operational independence), which, according to Andrew Rose (2006) is now in 
place in no fewer than 24 countries, was largely the outcome of un-coordinated improvisation on 
the part of national policy-makers. Nevertheless, the success of such formal inflation targeting to 
date has been remarkable. As Rose (2006) points out, the only countries which have given it up, 
Finland and Spain, did so as part of a prior plan to adopt the Euro. Unlike money growth 
targeting, it has nowhere been abandoned as unworkable. 
 Inflation targeting began in New Zealand, as part of a more general program designed to 
restore the health of an economy crippled by pervasive dirigisme. A systematic effort was made 
to identify the purposes of public sector agencies and programs, and, where these could be found, 
to bind those in charge to pursue them with appropriately designed contracts. The origins of the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s celebrated contract with the government thus lay, as Michael 
Reddell (1999) has argued, at least as much in principle-agent theory as in the theory of money. 
The fact that the Bank’s contract was stated in terms of inflation outcomes, moreover, rather than, 
say, money growth, was a direct consequence of another feature of the local landscape, namely 
that wholesale deregulation of the financial sector had rendered the behaviour of any money or 
credit aggregate totally uninformative. But to state a quantitative goal for monetary policy in 
terms of the inflation rate was nevertheless a leap in the dark. After all, it was conventional 
wisdom that a long and variable lag between the implementation of monetary policy and its 
effects on inflation made aiming it directly at such a distant goal a risky business. But for New 
Zealand, there seemed to be no alternative but to try. 
 Canada came next. At the end of the 1980s, inflation there began to drift upwards, and the 
Bank of Canada’s governor responded by announcing that policy would pursue a rather 
unspecific “price stability” goal. In early 1990, this policy encountered serious credibility 
problems in foreign exchange markets that were met by significant monetary tightening - as in 
1980, narrow money actually contracted  - and the onset of a recession almost as serious as that of 
                                                          
31And that order can also claim deep roots in a well established academic literature on the economics of common 
currencies, to which Robert Mundell’s (1961) contribution is the best known, though, as Cesarano (2006b) has 
shown, it has earlier origins than this. 
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a decade earlier began later in that year. At this very time, however, Canadian politicians had to 
become concerned about the credibility of monetary policy because a value added tax that would 
give a significant boost to the Consumer Price Index was about to be implemented, and trade-
unions were preparing to seek compensating money-wage increases, thus threatening to turn a one 
time price level increase into ongoing inflation. Out of this situation, there emerged in February 
1991, an agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Bank of Canada on “inflation 
reduction targets” that specified a time path for consumer price inflation that would take it down 
to 2 per cent by 1995, and promised “further progress to price stability” (left undefined pending 
further study, however, beyond entailing an inflation rate of clearly less than 2 per cent) 
thereafter. Two and a half years later, a change of government (and of central bank governor) was 
marked by what has turned out to be the indefinite postponement of the latter promise, and 2 per 
cent inflation (plus or minus 1 percentage point) has become an essentially permanent policy 
goal.32                    
 Similar stories of improvisation driven by local necessity mark the subsequent adoption of 
inflation targets elsewhere. In the UK, they were seized upon as a new anchor for monetary policy 
in the wake of sterling’s exit from the ERM, and they were also adopted in Finland and Sweden 
as means of stabilizing their domestic monetary systems in the wake of the EMS crisis, and then 
kept in place in preparation for the adoption of the Euro. It was only later second thoughts on the 
part the Swedish electorate that changed them there from a temporary to a seemingly permanent 
feature of the local monetary order. Australia is generally reckoned to be a targeter too, but 
ambiguously enough that there seems to be some doubt about the date of the regime's adoption. 
And so on – the spread of inflation targeting among emerging economies should also be noted 
here, though the details of this process are beyond the scope of this paper. Among advanced 
economies, setting aside the ECB, which, having given quantitative content to its price stability 
mandate by making an inflation rate below but close to 2 per cent its policy goal, looks like a 
targeter to many observers, the most conspicuous absentees from the roster of formal inflation 
targeters are now Japan, still awaiting the secure return its inflation rate to positive territory as its 
slow recovery from the 1990s continues, and the US, where the adjective formal is of some 
significance, since the Fed. is well known to have a “comfort zone” for inflation, which might 
play a larger role in the rhetoric of monetary policy were it not for the so-called “dual mandate” 
specified in its governing legislation. 
 The intriguing question about inflation targeting is why it has worked so well, particularly 
when its success seems to fly in the face of earlier conventional wisdom about the feasibility of 
stabilizing a variable which monetary policy affects with long and variable lag, and when there 
seems to be no evidence that such a program anywhere has had a direct effect on expectations. 
Inflation targeting central banks have earned their credibility over time by bringing inflation 
down and keeping it there, as indeed has the Fed. without the support of a formally announced 
program. Nor, does it seem plausible to attribute success to the alleged benign influence of 
globalization on the strength of inflationary pressures in the world economy in the 1990s. 
Increased trade with low wage countries should lower the relative prices of labour intensive 
                                                          
32However, this episode differed from the Coyne affair inasmuch as, rather than being forced into resignation, 
Governor John Crow decided not to seek re-appointment at the normal end of his term, apparently because he could 
not reach agreement with the new government about the retention of a long run price stability goal. Crow himself 
(2002) discusses this episode. For an overview of the evolution of inflation targeting in Canada, see Laidler and 
William Robson (2004)   
 20
goods, not the rate of change of the nominal prices of everything, and arguments to the contrary 
bear too much resemblance for comfort to old stories about cost-push inflation with the 
appropriate signs reversed.33  And, given political upheavals, wars, terrorist attacks, a string of 
international financial crises, not to mention huge swings in commodity prices, it is far from clear 
that the last fifteen years or so really have been any more devoid of potentially destabilizing 
shocks than were the 1970s and ‘80s. Let me nevertheless suggest the following explanation of 
inflation targeting’s success.  
 To begin with, obvious but still worth explicitly stating, inflation is, after all, a 
consequence of monetary policy, and this particular piece of economic understanding, so 
painfully regained in the two preceding decades, formed the very foundation for inflation 
targeting. At this most basic level, therefore, such a program provides a sound basis for a new 
monetary order in a way that, for example, direct intervention in labour and goods markets with 
wage and price guideposts or controls never could. Inflation targeting was, moreover, introduced 
almost everywhere in circumstances that required inflation to be stabilized and usually to be 
reduced as well, and, in stark contrast to money growth targeting, this worked in its favour. It is 
technically easy to stabilize inflation, particularly when it must also be reduced: a sufficiently 
sustained tightening of monetary policy (whether measured by a reduction in money growth or an 
increase in short-term nominal interest rates is barely relevant) will do the trick. Furthermore, and 
crucially, the well-established non-linearity of the short-run Phillips curve helps ensure that initial 
policy errors will have their most obvious consequences in an earlier than forecast arrival at 
whatever goal has been set (where inflation needs reducing), followed by a relatively “small” 
target undershoot, and in a tendency for any residual instability to be more visible in output than 
in inflation. When the first task of inflation targeting is to stabilize and/or reduce inflation, that is 
to say, it is output and employment that take the strain of policy miscalculations, but so long as 
such effects prove politically supportable, policy can err systematically on the tight side for long 
enough for even the most mechanically formulated inflation expectations to adjust to experience 
and begin to generate credibility for the regime.34 
 Such credibility, once established, is then self-re-enforcing in a number of ways. First, it 
promotes continuing clarity in monetary policy by keeping discussions among those in charge of 
it focused on an agreed goal. Second, to the extent that the costs of servicing public debt can 
create monetary stress, credible low inflation helps keep nominal interest rates down, and hence 
                                                          
33Nor am I yet convinced that national inflationary processes have changed by the fact that there seems to be 
important place for world output gap measures in domestic Phillips curves. (See for example Borio and Andrew 
Fitardo 2007) In the 1970s, we already knew that there was an important place for world inflation measures in such 
relationships, and indeed that it was possible to estimate them using “world” aggregate data  (See, for example, a 
number of the essays included in Parkin and George Zis  eds. 1976). Given the inevitably strong degrees of 
correlation among the relevant variables, we need some work to show that new work is not just rediscovering old 
results that still hold. Of particular interest here is the role of exchange rate regimes in helping to generate such 
results. Though formal pegging is much less common than it was, “fear of floating” could still help to produce cross 
country correlations in output and inflation fluctuations.           
34 Note that the foregoing discussion deals with what any inflation targeter has to achieve when the regime is 
introduced, and not with any special extra tasks imposed by  a period of targeted disinflation at the outset. I am 
grateful to Charles Freedman for drawing my attention to this distinction Of the fifteen countries pursuing stable 
inflation targets studied by Scott Roger and Mark Stone (2005), seven had adopted such stable targets from the outset 
and eight had begun with formal disinflation targets, as had a further five countries included in their study that were 
still in a disinflation phase at the time of its completion. 
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reduces those costs. Even more important, that same credibility helps to prevent the short run 
consequences of exogenous shocks, and even of monetary policy miscalculations, from feeding 
through to subsequent price and wage setting decisions.35 Successful inflation targeting, in short, 
contributes to a policy climate and a state of economic understanding that supports its own 
continued operation, as much among those for whom this understanding is merely a matter of 
rules of thumb that seem to work, as among those who resort to formal economic models to 
inform their decision making.36  Finally, as the Bundesbank knew even in the 1950s, there is 
political constituency for low and stable inflation. Ordinary voters understand what inflation is, 
and most of them don’t like it, so policy explicitly targeted at it can command political support of 
a kind that money growth targets, so remote from everyday experience, could never hope to 
attract. Perhaps the greatest strength of formal inflation targets is thus that they help to shield the 
central bank from the day to day pressures of politics. A minister of finance who might consider 
ordering a money-growth targeting central bank, or one without any clearly defined goal, to ease 
its policy in the interests of pursuing some other end, would have to think hard about explicitly 
and publicly ordering it to increase inflation, however worthy that other end might be. 
        
 
Looking Back and Looking Forward 
It is arguable that the first monetary policy success of the post-world-war-2 years was the survival 
of the Bretton Woods system for almost a quarter century. The international gold standard 
certainly lasted longer – about 35 years, from around 1880 until 1914 - and worked more 
smoothly too, but a fairer standard of comparison is surely the 20 years after the First World War, 
when successive failures to re-establish any kind of functioning international monetary order 
made their own contribution to the outbreak of the second. Even so, it must quickly be added that 
the Bretton Woods system’s eventual collapse was also the first major failure of the period, while 
the eventual and (almost) world-wide restoration of a reasonable degree of monetary stability 
since the early 1990s, the second major success since the Second World War, has been the 
outcome of a series of piecemeal local policy initiatives, many of them associated with inflation 
targeting, rather than a distinctively international event; and this current stability might just be 
fragile.  
 
Some Lessons from the Last Fifty Years 
The Bretton Woods system was self-consciously designed as an international monetary order 
suitable for its times, and it worked for a while because its policy concerns were clearly defined, 
and its institutions configured so that these could be addressed. The system, however, was 
intended to contribute to the post-war evolution of a wider international economic order that 
would, with the passage of time, come to rely increasingly on market forces, and we have seen 
that as these came to play a greater role in economic life, the misunderstandings about how they 
worked, based on faulty diagnoses of inter-war experience, that had informed the system’s design 
                                                          
35Indeed, once established, the credibility of low inflation even reduces the risks of “probing” the economy’s 
capacity to absorb expansionary impulses. Awkwardly for those who stress the importance of the formal inflation 
target itself for the regime’s success, the best example of this effect is surely the Fed’s success in the 1990s. 
36This is in contrast to exchange rate pegging for example, whose vulnerability to balance of payments shocks does 
not seem to diminish with the passage of time. 
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inevitably began to take their toll on its performance. In particular, the architects of the Bretton 
Woods system underestimated the extent to which the control of inflation would become the 
world’s primary monetary policy issue, and in their concern with other goals, paid insufficient 
attention to insulating their system against it. . 
 The onset of inflation destroyed that system, but that very experience in due course re-
established widespread understanding of the monetary nature of the phenomenon, the capacity of 
fiscal policy to undermine monetary stability, and of pegged exchange rates to transmit these 
effects internationally. And, the experience of such countries as Germany and Switzerland 
provided early confirmation that the more single-mindedly do domestic authorities concentrate on 
maintaining their currency’s internal value when the anchor for its external value begins to drag, 
the greater is their success likely to be. These lessons are, of course, platitudes, but even after the 
experience of the 1970s should have confirmed them as such among policy makers everywhere, 
the Louvre accord had adverse monetary consequences for Japan because this had not happened; 
while even today there are still countries anchoring their currencies to the US dollar during a new 
period of serious fiscal imbalance there. Perhaps, therefore, these platitudes still bear repeating. 
 Money growth targeting from the mid-1970s onwards yielded salutary lessons about the 
dangers of over-confidence when academic ideas are transferred to the policy arena. Institutional 
change within monetary systems did not begin in the mid-1970s, it was bound to matter for the 
way such policies would work, and yet it was largely ignored in their design and the difficulties 
they encountered therefore came as a much bigger surprise than they should have done. Perhaps 
that is why they produced an intellectual over-reaction whose influence continues to be all too 
widespread for comfort in much of the academic monetary economics that is now influencing day 
to day policy. Specifically, the fact that demand for money functions proved insufficiently stable 
over monthly or even quarterly intervals to provide a basis for regular monetary policy decisions, 
does not imply that the only variables of any significance for monetary policy under any 
circumstances are the short interest rates that central banks use as their instruments, but it seems 
to be widely believed nowadays that this is the case. The above-mentioned lessons about the 
dangers of applying academic ideas to policy without due caution, that is to say, have not yet 
quite sunk in.  
 Over-exclusive emphasis on the role of interest-rates in monetary policy has already done 
damage, having, in the 1990s, led the Bank of Japan into thinking that, once short interest rates 
reach zero, it had exhausted its options, and hence into not tackling promptly and vigorously the 
credit deadlock which followed the collapse of the “bubble economy”. This erroneous view of the 
limits of monetary policy is but one implication of what has now evolved into a standard model of 
the implementation of monetary policy through an interest rate instrument, which, though its day-
to-day usefulness is not in question, is inconsistent with the empirical evidence generated by the 
monetary history discussed in earlier in this paper. To put matters simply, this model has the 
quantity of money responding passively to variations in the arguments of its demand function and 
to that function’s error term, and hence implies that fluctuations in the quantity of money should 
lag behind those in interest rates, real income and prices, and not feed back into the system in any 
important way. But over the last fifty years, whenever such fluctuations have been significant, 
money has systematically led output, which in turn has led inflation. From the late 1960s 
onwards, the onset of inflation everywhere was preceded by increases in money growth, while the 
sometimes severe recessions that accompanied efforts to control it were preceded by the collapse 
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of money growth.37 It was the very pervasiveness of such evidence that undermined the 
intellectual consensus in favor of the cost-push ideas that had permitted the great inflation to get 
under way in the first place, and the view that the quantity of money is irrelevant for monetary 
policy is a curious legacy indeed to have been left by an inflation that was so clearly created by 
this variable’s misbehaviour.  
Useful or not then, as has been argued at greater length in Laidler (2002), there is 
something important missing from today’s standard monetary policy model, and it is a disturbing 
feature of many inflation targeting regimes that, as Charles Freedman (2006) has documented, 
they seem to be becoming more and more heavily dependent on it as time passes.38 There is still 
much to be said for deploying a reference value for money growth as a formal backstop within 
these regimes, or at least for according this variable a prominent informal role among the data that 
are routinely consulted as policy is made and monitored  
 
Prospects for a New Monetary Order 
Rose (2006) has recently suggested that the spread of inflation targeting heralds the development 
of a new international monetary order that stands Bretton Woods on its head by giving pride of 
place to domestic policy goals in the countries that make it up, while leaving it to foreign 
exchange markets to deal with domestic policy's consequences for the international monetary 
system. This way of looking at things is intriguing, and inflation targeting supported by market 
determined exchange rates certainly eliminates the problems that have arisen so often in the last 
fifty years when monetary policy has tried to pursue domestic goals while simultaneously setting 
exchange rate targets. But it is worth recalling that another pervasive feature of the experience 
surveyed in this paper has been the destructive power of divergences between beliefs about how 
monetary mechanisms work and the facts, and simply to devote monetary policy to domestic ends 
does nothing to eliminate such divergences. They remain dangerous, therefore, particularly should 
the embryonic monetary order envisaged by Rose come under stress, and there is considerable 
potential for such stress to arise nowadays. 
 First, though the Fed seems to conduct its day to day policies “as if” it were an inflation 
targeter, it lacks the extra degree of protection against political pressures to relax its policies in 
times of fiscal difficulty that formal targeting would give it. And this is surely becoming just such 
                                                          
37 Even so, the proposition that significant rises in inflation are always preceded by increases in money growth 
should not be reversed. The early 1980s saw bursts of money growth in a number of economies as increases in the 
demand for money caused by falls in the opportunity cost of holding it were accommodated. Milton Friedman’s 
(1984) all too well known prediction of an imminent inflationary threat in the US thus did not follow from his own 
monetary theory, and he should not have made it. It was, as he noted in a 2006 private communication to this author, 
“a major blooper”. Edward Nelson (2007) pp. 162- 166, discusses this episode in some detail, and places it in the 
broader context of Friedman’s role in US monetary policy debates. 
     
38 This model relies exclusively on a direct effect of the interest rate set by the monetary authorities on aggregate 
demand. Though such an effect surely exists, agents typically do not interact with the banking system simply to vary 
their holdings of cash balances, but to change their levels of indebtedness, and, when the interest rate is varied, this 
interaction has consequences for the behaviour of the money supply whose subsequent interaction with the demand 
for money is also an important component of monetary policy’s transmission mechanism. See Laidler (1999) for a 
discussion of the contrast between the “passive” and this “active” view of money's role, and for references to the 
literature dealing with these ideas.  Michael Woodford’s (2006) recent demonstration of the irrelevance of money to 
the conduct of monetary policy is contingent upon a passive-money model, and hence does not counter the arguments 
advanced here, and Charles Goodhart’s (2007) caution about his results is well taken.  
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a time. Second, though the ECB does recognize a policy role for monetary aggregates, and does 
pursue a quantitative inflation goal as well, this goal is of its own choosing, and elected 
governments are not implicated in it, beyond their ongoing commitment to the Maastricht Treaty, 
a fact which, it has already been suggested, might imply that the ECB is too well insulated from 
day to day political pressures for its own long run good. The Growth and Stability Pact 
notwithstanding, it is simply not clear whether the institutional structure through which the 
tensions among central bankers and elected politicians that growing divergences among national 
fiscal policies with the Euro zone threaten to create is up to the job, and a monetary order that 
cannot cope with such pressures might prove brittle. 
 So the future stability of neither of the world’s two main internationally used currencies is 
quite secure at present, while Japan, the source of a third, is likely to find the public debt levels 
inherited from the 1990s hard to cope with when emerges from deflation. Meanwhile, fear of the 
floating exchange rates that are so necessary for inflation targeting’s adoption still seems to be 
rather widespread elsewhere in the world - China in particular comes to mind here as a place 
where policy makers might do well to study the lessons yielded by Japanese experience of the late 
1980s about the dangers of pursuing incompatible exchange rate and inflation goals in 
circumstances where asset markets can get out of hand.  
 If, then, Rose’s attractive vision of inflation targeting’s future role as the basis of a new 
international monetary order is to come to fruition, that regime needs to spread more widely than 
it has as yet. And if it is to be robust in the face of the shocks that might hit the international 
monetary system in the meanwhile, it would do well to avoid becoming too reliant on a model of 
monetary policy that cannot explain the salient facts about money growth’s temporal relationship 
to inflation rates that the world’s monetary systems generated the last time they went out of 
control. In short, though inflation in the world economy is now lower and more stable than 
anyone would have predicted even as recently as the beginning of the 1990s, and though we may 
be  closer to a coherent international monetary order now than at any time since the late 1960s, 
the way forward is not yet risk-free. 
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